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ABSTRACT

Issues concerning philosophies of education are addressed. Education is defined as a process by which someone attempts to change another in a desirable way. The educational process can be represented on a continuum, one side of which primarily benefits the individual while the other side primarily benefits the community or society. The change being fostered in the educational process may be designed to maintain stability or to promote improvements or transformations. Beyond the individual and society and beyond a continuum of stability and change, there is a third dimension: relating the learner to the laws of nature, the principles that govern things, and the basic ideas of the world. Philosophies of education will arise as different meanings or different emphases are attributed to these different elements. Maps or charts of these different meanings or emphases were submitted to members of the Missouri Valley Philosophy of Education Society (MVPES) and to college students. Respondents were asked to locate on the map what American high schools should most emphasize or what they do emphasize. MVPES respondents were also asked to rate the philosophy associated with Horace Mann, Plato, Dewey, Rousseau, and A. S. Neill. The way that different philosophies relate to each other and other questions are discussed. (SW)

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Mapping and Sequencing: Philosophy of Education Reconsidered

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I

A student might ask, "How many philosophies of education are there?" The philosopher must answer, "It depends." The early Progressives usually spoke of two - the Traditional and the New. Others speak of three; Butler of four. Is the question the same as asking how many slices are there in a pie? Or is it like asking how many servings of ¼ pounds there are in a pound of hamburger?

I begin with an observation and follow it with a host of questions. The observation is that there are indeed many philosophies of education.

The questions I ask are:

1) Why can't I give a number and say "There are X (2,3,4,5) philosophies of education." After all, I can say, "There are 48 contiguous states in the Union," or "There are two sexes," or "The Trinity has three parts," or "There are four temperments," or "There are five kinds of Generals," or "Six Flags Over Texas," or "Seven Deadly Sins." Is saying "There are four sides to a square" the same as saying "There are four philosophies of education"? The former is an analytical statement. From it we can conclude that there can never be a fifth side. Is the latter statement analytical or synthetic? Can it be true and still admit to a fifth philosophy at some other time?

2) How do the philosophies relate to each ~~culture~~ other? If I am a New Yorker (i.e., born there), I cannot be a Texan; these are mutually exclusive. But if I am envious, I can also be slothful or avaricious; sins are not mutually exclusive. When we say everyone should know his own philosophy of education, do we mean one

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that is mutually exclusive of others, or merely that there is a dominant one at a particular time?

3) And when we talk about states or sexes or generals, we know the criterion for inclusion in each category. But by what criterion do we categorize philosophies of education? Brameld is explicit about this - he categorizes according to their position with respect to social change. But most authors do not provide a criterion. They assert, "There are X philosophies of education," and then go on to describe them.

4) When we say, "There are so and so," where are they? In current usage? Do we then include "Objective Relativism," "Secular Humanism," etc., or do we limit ourselves to the 3 or 4 leading ones. Which are - how do we define - the leading ones? Or are they in the History of Education, whatever that is?

5) While there are several members in a class or classification, when does it make sense to say some members are better than others? Orwell saw the problem clearly: First we believe "All Animals are Equal" and then we add "...but some are more equal than others." We have the problem with the Trinity. The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are all equal. But Arian believed that the Father was more equal than the Son - a heresy to Christians, but was he wrong? We believe all the states are equal, But clearly California and Texas are not equal with Rhode Island or Delaware. There are the three Christian virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, but the greatest of them is Charity, said Paul. If we believe in cultural pluralism or multicultural education, do we believe that all cultures are equally worthy, or are some more worthy than others? "Are standards compatible with democracy?" asked Irving Babbitt. Are some philosophies of education better than others?

II

For some time I have been trying to reconsider many issues concerning the nature or structure of philosophy of education. At the present time, there are many who still take what I call, without any attempt to be pejorative, the "dependency" approach, claiming that a philosophy of education depends upon a prior, traditional philosophy such as idealism, realism, pragmatism or existentialism. More recently, others have claimed that philosophies of education should be "independent" of the traditional philosophies and should develop out of the educational domain, sui generis. Still more recently others have claimed that the purpose (the only one?) of philosophy of education is to do philosophical analyses of educational concepts, and not to bother with the various "isms."

While I applaud the clarity and many accomplishments of the last approach, I cannot reject the earlier attempts to identify various philosophies of education, or archetypical positions, whether these are "dependent" or "independent." We need convenient categories, usually few in number, to classify people, beliefs and phenomena. While recognizing the oversimplification, we characterize people as introverts or extroverts, as ectomorphs, endomorphs or mesomorphs; we talk about liberals or conservatives, about optimists and pessimists, about democrats and authoritarians, ad nauseam.

Now classifications involve input from both the classifier and the thing being classified. The classifier undertakes his effort because of some aim, interest or value that he brings with him which determines the criteria imposed. But the classifier is somewhat constrained by the nature of reality,

the thing being classified, although it usually lends itself to multiple interpretations or classifications. A great many qualities of individuals are ignored when we describe someone as an introvert or extrovert. The classification is accepted as a good or useful one if our interests are similar to the classifier and if the qualities which are selected to be classified are predictive of, or relate in some probablistic way to, other aspects of the thing being classified.

The problem with philosophies of education - i.e. the classification schemes which are currently in use - is that they seem to be losing their cogency, their power of providing meaningful simplicity to the confusing world we confront. This may be due to our aims diverging from the classifiers and/or due to the changing nature of the reality being classified. But this lack of cogency doesn't mean that we should abandon classificatory schemes or philosophies of education. It does mean that we should reconsider the issue.

Accordingly, I am attempting an approach which may begin to clarify the situation. It begins with education defined or conceived as a process by which someone attempts to change another in a desirable way. Frankena says, "There is always someone doing the educating, someone being educated, something being fostered in the second by the first..."

Within this territory, philosophies of education will arise as different meanings or different emphases are attributed to the various terms in the definition. These different meanings or emphases can be mapped or charted, as we shall see. The mapping needs to take into account the following implications of the definition:

(1) Education is dyadic; it is a relationship

between an educator and an educatee, which is a social relationship. The two, however, need not be in direct physical proximity; a writer may be an educator and never meet the reader-educatee. Or conversely, the educatee may be self-educated, in which case he internalizes the role of the educator. If an individual changes because of his experience or because of natural growth which does not involve another, we may have learning or development, but not education. In the social relationship of education, the one being educated must be changed in a desirable way to him. If the change in him is desirable only to the so-called educator who benefits from the change, the process is more properly called indoctrination, brainwashing, or training.

However, it is not uncommon for both parties to benefit from the process. An example of the educatee benefiting alone could be a tennis lesson. A parent educating a child could benefit both parties by creating a more harmonious family. A sergeant drilling someone conscripted under compulsory military service, however, may not benefit the draftee, and the term "training" would be more appropriate than "education." Hence, we can construct a continuum, with one pole representing the desirable change accruing only to the individual, and the other pole representing the desirable change accruing primarily to the educator.

Now the relationship implies the greater knowledge, wisdom or experience of the educator, and this has two important implications. First, the educator may know what is desirable for the educatee, even though the educatee does not; what is desirable

is not always desired by him. The acceptance of this distinction legitimizes compulsory education and confers authority on the teacher. Secondly, the educator invariably has greater wisdom and knowledge insofar as he has had access to the funded experiences of his society and culture. Hence it is usually the case that the educator is the agent, sometimes deliberately, sometimes casually, of a larger group - perhaps the community, the society, the nation, the culture, civilization or humanity.

The above remarks can be charted on the vertical coordinate of the graph (Figure 1) with the lower pole representing an educational process whose purpose primarily berefits the individual and whose purpose primarily benefits the individual and whose upper pole primarily benefits society (or community, culture, etc.).

(2) Now the change being fostered in the educational process may be designed to maintain stability or to promote improvements or transformation. A sailor may indeed change the position of his sails to either maintain his course or alter his direction. He cannot leave his sails alone in either case, as the educator finds he must often do something to the student simply to maintain his adjustment or the stability of the society, while a different process may alter the individual or the society. An "activity" curriculum or a curriculum which is predicated on the acceptance of evolution or even rapid change may have as its purpose the adjustment or adaptation of the individual to the traditional mores and values of his culture. Traditional curricula may produce revolutionary transformations, on

the other hand.

Now this dimension of the educational process can be charted on the horizontal coordinate with the left-hand pole representing transformation, and the intermediate positions representing degrees of change or improvement.

Both coordinates can be graduated; the horizontal from, for example, 1 to 13 and the vertical from A to M. On this graph we can now chart the position of anyone with respect to his ideas about change and about the individual-society relationship. We could derive four archetypical tendencies, one for each quadrant, and take these as our norm or classificatory system:

(a) Maintaining the society (upper left)

(b) Transforming the society (upper right)

(c) Maintaining the individual (lower left)

(d) Transforming the individual (lower right).

On the other hand, we could have 169, even an infinite number of locations if we could pinpoint the center of a given philosophical position. For example, if we were to locate Thomas Jefferson, we could argue that in his educational thinking his focus was clearly on producing "wise and honest" leaders; at the same time he spoke of having a revolution every twenty years. There would probably be some consensus in locating him at I-11. If we wanted to locate the educational philosophy of West Point, we would place it in the vicinity of L-2.

(3) Beyond the individual and society and beyond a continuum of stability and change, there is a third dimension to the

educational process, which is necessarily implied, but not articulated, in our definition. This is Reality, the universe, the context within which education operates and the substance upon which the four previously mentioned archetypes depend, to wit:

(e) relating the learner to the universe or Reality.

Relating the learner to the universe or Reality may mean relating him to God, but in public education it usually means relating him to the laws of nature, the principles which govern things, the basic ideas of the world, and this is usually an intellectual or rational activity. As such we could enlarge our "map" by adding a third tier:



But the object of our intellectual understanding, the laws and principles of the universe, are unchanging. We do not speak of maintaining or changing or transforming Newton's Third Law. So the "map" cannot indicate a "change continuum" and should, perhaps, be drawn as follows:



However, this puts "a" and "b" (society) in contact with Reality (e) but does not allow "c" or "d" (individual) to have direct contact with Reality. This is especially inadequate because Reality may be apprehended in non-intellectual ways, ways not mediated by the social tools of language and mathematics, i.e., by intuition or revelation. Hence, a better mapping might put the square graph into an encompassing circle, as indicated in Figure 1 (see Appendix), with the circle representing Reality.

III

The map (Figure I) and the mapping procedure were submitted to members of the Missouri Valley Philosophy of Education Society and to students at Wichita State University. The former group was asked to locate on the map "What I believe American schools should most emphasize," (it is assumed this bears a relationship to their own position), while the latter were asked to indicate their personal philosophy of education. Other data were collected about the students and related to their responses. The MVPES was also asked to locate the following: "What American high schools

do," "What American elementary schools do," Horace Mann, Plato, Dewey, Rousseau, A.S. Neill and "four other important persons of your choice."

Some Survey Results: Students

For ease of tabulation, responses were tabulated according to the five positions stated above. Sometimes the two social positions (A and B) were compared to the two individual positions (C and D). Other times the two change or improvement positions (B and D) were compared to the two conservative positions (A and C).

1) Individual positions (C and D) were chosen about twice as much as social positions (A and B). When (E) responses above and below the mid-line are counted in, the pattern is even more pronounced:

(N = 93)

A) 13%	(A + B) 23%
B) 10%	(C + D) 41%
C) 19%	----------
D) 22%	(A + B + E) 31%
E) 36%	(C + D + E) 69%

2) With respect to sex, females tend more toward conservative philosophies (A and C) while males tend more toward improvement philosophies (B and D):

	F (n = 68)	M (N = 25)
Conservative (A + C)	37%	20%
Improvement (B + D)	28%	40%
"Reality" (E)	35%	40%

3) The <u>older</u> the student, the more likely he is to choose <u>individual</u> (C and D) positions.

	Born in 1960's (N=49)	in 1950's (N=32)	1940's (N=10)	1930's (N=2)
A	8	4	0	0
B	4	4	1	0
C	10	5	2	1
D	10	8	3	0
E	17	11	4	1

<u>Some Survey Results: Missouri Valley</u>

Seventy-seven surveys were mailed out; ten usable responses were received; three letters were returned "address unknown"; one declined to complete the form because he was no longer in the field; and two gentlemen sent me a note which they both signed, claiming that they were deceased.

1) MVPES respondents were overwhelmingly social-transformation (B) oriented.
2) They interpreted John Dewey in almost the exact same way.
3) They saw the Elementary and High Schools similarly, as Social-conservationists (A).
4) A.S. Neill was clearly seen as an Individual-transformist (D).
5) Both Plato and Mann were Socially oriented, but were scattered over A and B.
6) Rousseau was Individual-transformist (D), but was also placed in (B) and (C).

7) Thirty-four different names were nominated additionally. Paolo Friere was named 3 times and King, Marx, Reagen, Emerson, Peters, Counts, Skinner and Aristotle were named twice. The overwhelming number of nominations were placed on the Transformation side (10-13), with an almost equal number as Social and Individual.

8) The Gregorc instrument was tabulated for both highest scores, which revealed no pattern, and lowest scores, which revealed a strong aversion to Concrete Sequential:

	C S	A R	A S	C R
High score	2	2 (+ tie)	3 (+ tie)	3
Low score	7 (+ tie)	2	1 (+ tie)	1
Total score	223	275	293	294

IV

When I asked "Where are philosophies of education?" following the statement "There are X philosophies of education," I was asking essentially the same question that has plagued philosophy since Plato grappled with universals or ideas. Philosophies of education are not located in the mind of philosophers of education alone; they have some kind of independent being. Progressivism will be a Philosophy of Education even if there are no Progressives. Ideas are logically independent entities. We become aware of them as our interests dictate and they become instruments of our actions, as Dewey argued. They are not merely instruments. The fountain-pen and the horse-drawn plow will continue to exist - probably in museums - even though their utility has been transcended.

If certain conditions exist, if certain assumptions are made or interpretive attitudes are taken, then certain other things will follow. (This common-sensical view is at the core of C.I. Lewis' conception of the pragmatic a priori). It is my point of departure in answering the question about the number of philosophies of education.

I believe that if we define "education" as we did, two criteria of philosophies of education will necessarily emerge. These can serve as coordinates on a graph or map. If the map is divided into quadrants, four philosophies of education will exist. An infinite number of divisions, or philosophical positions, however, are possible. Though distinct, each position is located on a continuum and is related to the other positions. At any point in time or place one position is indeed mutually exclusive of all others, but there is no real logical opposition between the positions unless we encourage the hardening of the categories, and create antinomies out of polar opposites. If I am chewing on a steak, I cannot be sipping a highball through a straw simultaneously; these behaviors are mutually exclusive. Clearly, however, there is no logical opposition between them. As it is foolish to demand that we choose between steak and highballs, it is foolish to ask students to define their philosophy of education. Bodies and minds can be nourished by a varied diet.

We can make an infinite number of divisions on our map: how should we actually divide it? Here we have an empirical possibility. Let's have various groups of people who are using philosophies of education today indicate what are desirable positions to them, and positions which they perceive to actually exist in the educational marketplace. If it turns

out that there are only three focuses on the map, we will speak of there being three philosophies of education - in operation today, that is. To pursue the nourishment metaphor again: we can identify whole classes of edible entities - including seaweed, algae, grass, kidneys, brains, intestines, testicles, ice cream, potatoes, lobster, worms, ants, grasshoppers and flies. Our books on nutrition will not mention many of these delicacies, however - only those used to nourish us today.

By the same token, if we have a yen for peanuts (or maybe a salt and protein deficiency), we will be willing to say that peanuts are better than spinach. At other times, as our situation changes, we will not think peanuts are so good. Analogously, philosophies of education can be regarded as good or bad or "true" or "false" ("true to") in the sense of being appropriate or not to a given situation. Utilized as instruments, they may be time-specific, place-specific or task-specific. Other tools, after all, like forks and spooks and knives are not good tools or bad, except in relation to a given task.

Summary

Five questions were asked about the philosophy of education at the beginning of this paper, and each has been answered:

1) How many philosophies of education are there?

   If philosophies of education vary according to their emphasis on the two elements (individual-society and change), that is, according to their place on a continuum, and if a line or

continuum is infinitely divisible, there can be an infinite number of philosophies of education. If we harden our categories and divide the continuum in terms of its polar extremes, we have four basic philosophies of education. If the question means "How many philosophies of education are held currently?" then we must begin to count noses.

2) How does each philosophy relate to the others?

Operationally they must be time-specific, space-specific and task-specific, and must, therefore, be mutually exclusive. Logically or conceptually, however, they are complementary.

3) By what criterion do we categorize philosophies of education?

We categorize by the elements necessarily implied in one's definition of education. We argued that our definition necessitates an individual-society continuum and a change continuum.

4) Where are philosophies of education?

They are always in the realm of logically necessary entities, or some of them are sometimes in the minds of philosophers of education; they emerge in historic context and are endorsed or rejected in terms of their instrumentality.

5) Are some philosophies of education (or one) better than others?

This is a corollary of (2). Time, space or task-specifically there may be a one best; sub specie aeternitatis they are all good and necessary to explicate the meaning of education, or equally good in developing the educated person.

V

Toward the Future: Sequencing Philosophies of Education

Political scientists have shown an enormous interest in relating political philosophies and loyalties to all kinds of demographic data. We have become familiar with the relationships between income, race, ethnicity, religion, occupation and age to political positions, and there seems to be emerging sex differences as well. Why do we have such little data with respect to educational philosophies? Are educational philosophies so different from political philosophies? Do educational philosophers believe the collection of such data is beneath them, or is it more properly the task of sociologists of education? Why hasn't the latter group undertaken the task?

I cannot begin to answer these questions. I suspect some of the following observations may contribute to the answer: there is widespread ignorance about philosophies of education, even among professional educators, sociologists of education and psychologists of education; there is widespread naivity that partisanship does not belong in education, that the schools should be "neutral"; there is a feeling that education is concerned with some kind of natural development or growth and there is no real argument about essential questions.

Developmentalists and stage-theorists have already confronted the basic theme of this paper, which is the problem of the One and the Many. How can we avoid Relativism when we examine the worthy claims of the many? How can we avoid Absolutism when we must choose and act on one position? Time-sequencing has been their answer.

Perhaps we can begin to do this with philosophies of education. I therefore propose that we examine the positions which we have already outlined in terms of the following scheme:

Stage One. The newborn human is immobile, helpless, dependent and relatively devoid of instincts. For survival, he must assimilate the patterns of behavior, the values, the skills and knowledge that those around him have found to be functional. He must learn by their experience. Similarly, the family, group, society etc. needs to take the relatively undifferentiated newborns and make them into valuable members of the community, or the community will not survive. Hence position (A), social conservation is the appropriate one.

Stage Two. The individual cannot be taught by others everything which needs to be known. Further, what had been taught and learned previously may be undergoing change and needs to be modified. It is necessary that the individual learns how to learn. Though there are obvious social implications to this, this position is best described as individual-conservation or life-adjustment or problem-solving (C).

Stage Three. The individual had been taught and trained and indoctrinated by his society initially, and then learned to become self-taught, etc. He gradually comes to see that some of what he has appropriated is contradictory or that as he develops his own ideals or norms, much of what he has learned needs to be abandoned if he is to become authentic. He is now in position (D), and is undergoing individual-transformation.

Stage Four. As he grows in awareness and in his ability to alter his environment he sees the way his own ideas and values had been shaped by his

society and how social arrangements create and reinforce ideas. He sees the desirability of improving social arrangements as a means to sustaining his own new-found authenticity, as well as providing a more adequate "informal education" and life for subsequent generations. He is now in position (B), social-transformation.

Stage Five. The more adequate personal values and knowledge, as well as the improved social arrangements are seen to be in need of justification by some objective entity (such as nature, law, etc.) which can be known through "contemplation" or reason. He is now in position (E); he has transcended the space-time coordinates of the square and is within the circle.

Tally

A - 13
B - 6
C - 18
D - 25
E - 34
96

Figure 1